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Do Economic Downturns Dampen Patent Litigation? 
 
[forthcoming 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 481 (2015)] 
 




Recent studies estimate that the economic impact of U.S. patent litigation may be as large as 
$80 billion per year and that the overall rate of U.S. patent litigation has been growing rapidly 
over the past 20 years. And yet, the relationship of the macroeconomy to patent litigation rates 
has never been studied in any rigorous fashion. This lacuna is notable given that there are two 
opposing theories among lawyers regarding the effect of economic downturns on patent 
litigation. One camp argues for a substitution theory, holding that patent litigation should 
increase in a downturn because potential plaintiffs have a greater incentive to exploit patent 
assets relative to other investments. The other camp posits a capital constraint theory that 
holds that the decrease in cash flow and available capital disincentivizes litigation. Analyzing 
quarterly patent infringement suit filing data from 1971-2009 using a time-series vector 
autoregression (VAR) model, we show that economic downturns have significantly affected 
patent litigation rates. (To aid other researchers in testing and extending our analyses, we have 
made our entire dataset available online.) Importantly, we find that these effects have changed 
over time. In particular, patent litigation has become more dependent on credit availability in a 
downturn. We hypothesize that such changes resulted from an increase in use of contingent-
fee attorneys by patent plaintiffs and the rise of nonpracticing entities (NPEs), which unlike 
most operating companies, generally fund their lawsuits directly from outside capital sources. 
Over roughly the last 20 years, we find that macroeconomic conditions have affected patent 
litigation in contrasting ways. Decreases in GDP (particularly economy-wide investment) are 
correlated with significant increases in patent litigation and countercyclical economic trends. 
On the other hand, increases in T-bill and real interest rates as well as increases in economy-
wide financial risk are generally correlated with significant decreases in patent suits, leading to 
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procyclical trends. Thus, the specific nature of a downturn predicts whether patent litigation 
rates will tend to rise or fall. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the arena of patent litigation, there are two competing theories that explain the influence of 
the macroeconomic environment on firms’ motives to file suit. On one account, the decline in 
firm revenues associated with falling aggregate demand encourages firms to reduce litigation 
in intellectual property suits as a method of reducing costs and maintaining profitability.
1
 For 
example, during the most recent downturn, an American Bar Association email to intellectual 
property lawyers advertising a seminar on how to reduce expenses declared “The economy is 
still in the doldrums, and electronic documents have exponentially increased the costs and 
burdens of discovery. What can you do?”
2
 Relatedly, shortages in available capital may 
reduce the supply of contingent-fee law firms available to represent plaintiffs, especially 
independent inventors and small firms, who have increasingly used contingent-fee 
arrangements in patent infringement actions.
3
 
On another account, a decline in profits spurs firms to extract greater revenue from 
dormant assets by litigating more aggressively against perceived infringers.
4
 Because the 
relative internal rate of return on investing in patent litigation rises during downturns, it 
becomes a more attractive business strategy relative to other investment opportunities. A 
front-page article from the New Jersey Law Journal printed during the downturn of the early 
2000s demonstrates this tack: “However Hard the Market Falls, Soft Landing Seen for IP 
Lawyers,”
5
 as does an IP Law 360 headline from the most recent downturn: “Drive for IP 
Profits Accelerates Q2 Patent Suits.”
6
 The IP Law 360 article noted that several patent 
litigators attributed a short-term uptick in patent litigation to efforts to generate revenue in a 
weak economy.
7
 Additionally, economic downturns may make the financial benefits of 
                                                 
1
 See Section II; see also Bachmeier et al. (2003, 192) (“Litigation is a costly endeavor, and individual 
plaintiffs and their attorneys, who may be financing the expenses of a lawsuit and are paid through 
contingency arrangements, would presumably be influenced by economic conditions.”). 
2
 Bureau of National Affairs & American Bar Association (2009); see also Tu (2009) (making a series 
of recommendations to reduce patent-related costs during the most recent downturn). Additionally, 
the value of winning a patent infringement suit may decrease in an economic downturn, though one 
would expect this effect to be marginal, since winning patentees can recover damages going back six 
years and garner either an injunction or damages on a going-forward basis. See 35 U.S.C. § 286; 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
3
 See Thomas (1998, 328); Cahr and Kalina (2006); Fabricant & Dickstein Shapiro (2009, 2010); 
Schwartz (2012). 
4
 See also Bachmeier et al. (2003, 193) (“[D]oes a weak economy force firms to seek opportunities 
within the legal system to replace diminished opportunities in the marketplace?”). 
5
 See Bachmeier et al. (2003, p. 192) (citing Gottlieb (2001, 1-16). 
6
 See Cherney (2010). 
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infringement greater relative to potential costs, thus increasing overall infringing activity and 
potentially spurring more suits. 
 Both accounts of how economic downturns affect the rates of patent litigation are 
theoretically plausible and, indeed, could simultaneously drive the expansion and contraction 
of patent litigation.
8
 Given the downturn in suits filed during the most recent economic 
recession—with its concomitant effects on attorney hiring, law firm and judicial planning, and 
corporate budgeting—determining which tendencies are more salient is certainly of great 
interest to law firms, the corporate sector, and the judiciary.
9
  Moreover, other than scattered 
anecdotal accounts and simple graphical analysis (e.g., superimposing graphs of GDP over 
patent litigation counts),
10
 there has been no systematic study of how macroeconomic 
conditions affect the rates of patent litigation. Thus, rigorous study of these macroeconomic 
effects is also of significant interest to economists and empirical legal scholars. 
 To answer these questions, we assembled data covering patent litigation suits filed in 
U.S. district courts from 1971-2009, as well as more than 15 macroeconomic variables of 
interest during the same time period. Consistent with previous studies examining 
macroeconomic effects on litigation rates,
11
 we use a time-series vector autoregression (VAR) 
approach—a sophisticated econometric method developed by Christopher Sims, who won the 
Nobel Prize for his work.
12
  Controlling for a host of potential explanatory factors, we find 
that the macroeconomy has had significant effects on patent litigation rates during the time 
period in question. However, we find these effects started to change substantially sometime in 
the mid-80s to mid-90s. Of course, the rise of nonpracticing entities (NPEs) and operating 
companies seeking to generate substantial licensing revenue has changed the nature of patent 
litigation dramatically.
13
 Starting in the mid-1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s, 
patent litigation embarked on a shift from suits that were primarily between competitors to 
suits often driven by the desire of patentees to obtain licensing revenue from non-
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 Id.; see also Chopra and Negi (2010) (“Whatever the reason, patent activity (litigation, innovation etc) 
only surges in response to a recession.”). 
8
 See, e.g., Bachmeier et al. (2003:193) (“For example, will intellectual property lawsuits more likely 
occur in an up or down economy?”). 
9
 Although we do not expect law firms to engage in forecasting on the basis of our results, simply 
knowing that patent litigation may increase or decrease in volume given the general characteristics of 
a current downturn may be helpful in general planning, especially for very large law firms and 
corporations that engage in or defend numerous suits per year.  For instance, based on a search in 
Docket Navigator, Google is currently involved in over 100 patent cases in the district courts, and the 
most active law firms routinely handle more than 100 cases at any given time. 
10
 See, e.g., Riel and  Meiklejohn (2010). 
11
 See Bachmeier et al. (2003). 
12
 See Sims et al. (1990). 
13
 See Risch (2012) (reporting that large-scale NPEs began at least the mid-1980s and were active by 
the 1990s); Rivette and Kline (2000) (discussing strategies for operating companies to boost their 
patent licensing revenue), and Detkin (2007) (discussing various patent licensing business models). 
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competitors.
14
 These licensing-driven suits are often handled by contingent-fee attorneys and 
funded by outside capital sources.
15
  
 Thus, it is not surprising that in the earlier years of our sample (roughly the 1970s and 
1980s) scarcity of credit had no negative impact on patent litigation. Moreover, economic 
downturns in this period, particularly declines in investment and consumption (important 
components of GDP), were associated with decreases in patent litigation rates. On the other 
hand, decreases in the NASDAQ index were associated with increases in patent litigation, but 
the effects were relatively small compared to those of investment and consumption. We 
interpret these results as showing that patent litigation rates in the 1970s and 1980s were 
mainly driven by the level of total private infringement, which is proxied by economy-wide 
investment and consumption, along with a mild increase in patent litigation during downturns 
for NASDAQ-listed companies. Thus, for these earlier years, it appears that the 
macroeconomy played only a minor role in determining the overall amount of patent litigation.  
 Yet in the later period (roughly the last 20-25 years), we find evidence for both 
contemporary (and seemingly countervailing) theories of economic downturns. Our results 
thus explain the current debate. We show statistically significant countercyclical correlations 
between patent litigation and GDP (particularly, economy-wide investment), and generally 
procyclical correlations with T-bill and real interest rates and the TED spread (a measure of 
overall financial risk). In general, over the past 20 years or so, our analysis shows that patent 
litigation rates may rise or fall following an economic decline depending on the relative shifts 
in macroeconomic factors driving the downturn. Patent litigation rates tend to increase in 
economic downturns characterized mostly by declines in investment and other measures of 
productivity, provided that credit remains freely available. Declines characterized by the 
converse situation, as in the most recent recession, are associated with a decrease in litigation 
rates. Based on our regressions, we delineate the procyclical and countercyclical factors 
affecting patent litigation.  
 Section II of the article describes the relevant background literature, including 
statistically unreliable attempts made by practicing lawyers to study the issue addressed here, 
as well as more reliable studies on the effects of the economy on other types of lawsuits. 
Section III describes our data set and methods. Section IV presents our results, and Section V 
offers some reflections and caveats. Section VI concludes.  
 To aid other researchers in testing and extending our analyses, we have made our 















have also made our STATA log files for our main specifications and Granger causality tests 
available.  See 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0By8e96MfxcvWY0JCbmhJM0FEYXM/view?usp=sharing. 
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II.  BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
Despite the presence of off-hand remarks of one ilk or another concerning the effect of 
economic downturns on the incidence patent litigation—and rough-hand superimpositions by 
lawyers of graphs of GDP or stock market indices on patent suit counts—we know of no 
study to examine the issue in any empirically rigorous fashion. Riel and Meiklejohn (2010), a 
law student and practicing lawyer, respectively, purport to estimate the relationship between 
the “state of the US economy” and “patent litigation activity” by superimposing line graphs of 
GDP on the total numbers of patent cases filed in U.S. district courts, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, and the International Trade Commission. In so doing, they conclude that 
(1) “there appears to be no correlation between changes in the US economy and patent 
litigation” over the “long-term”; (2) following “contractions in the economy patent litigation 
activity in the district courts tends to increase substantially”; and (3) more recently, patent 
litigation has not increased following downturns, and this is “likely a result of influences other 
than changes in the US economy.”
17
 
 Although Riel and Meiklejohn (2010) is instructive in terms of descriptive statistics, it 
is unreliable as a predictive model. Specifically, such a method offers no quantifiable measure 
of statistical significance. It also fails to distinguish among different elements of the economy, 
each of which may produce different effects. More importantly it fails to account for several 
statistical problems common to time-series data. First, graphical analyses can account for the 
relationship between two—or at most three—variables of interest. For example, Riel and 
Meiklejohn (2010) analyze GDP in isolation. Because economic downturns may be different 
in character,
18
 just measuring GDP fails to capture how differences in downturns may 
differentially affect patent litigation rates. Notably, Riel and Meiklejohn (2010) fail to 
examine macroeconomic variables concerning overall financial risk and the availability of 
credit—and as we show below—because of this, mistakenly posit that the reduction in patent 
litigation rates in the most recent recession likely results from “influences other than changes 
in the US economy.” Further, explanatory variables may influence patent litigation with a lag, 
complicating any simple graphical analysis. Last, time-series data are known to suffer from 
problems of simultaneity. Simultaneity occurs because macroeconomic variables such as GDP, 
consumption, unemployment, and the like are interdependent.
19
 
Other studies contain useful anecdotal data or address related issues. Based on data 
obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Crouch (2009) and Quinn 
(2009) report a mild to moderate decline—ranging roughly from 2-15 percent—in patent 
applications in FY2009.
20
 Relatedly, Harhoff and von Graevenitz (2009) show that decreases 
                                                 
17
 Riel and Meiklejohn (2010, 103).  
18
 See, e.g., Krugman & Wells (2009, 315-16). 
19
 Similarly, in a presentation made at an intellectual property attorney conference, Olson (2009) 
graphically examines stock indices and patent litigation data, attempting to draw conclusions about 
the effects of market changes on filing rates. Again, while instructive, it is an inappropriate method 
from which to draw statistical inferences. 
20
 See also Goldman (2009) (noting the recent drop in patent filings) and Breitzman (2013) (noting that 
small firms decreased patent filings more than large firms in the most recent downturn). 
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in private investment in the United States are correlated with reductions in filings at the U.S. 
Patent Office. Although Crouch’s (2009) and Harhoff and von Graevenitz’s (2009) 
investigations indicate that economic downturns may decrease patent filings, the drivers of 
patent litigation are arguably quite different—in particular, patent applications do not mature 
into assertable rights for several years and, thus, cannot provide immediate value to a cash-
constrained patentee. In fact, the filing of patent applications and the filing of patent lawsuits 
can be competing investment opportunities. On the other hand, litigation and patent 
applications may be complements at the firm level if a reputation for patent enforcement 
makes new applications more valuable. Additionally, Quinn (2009) suggests that increasing 
rejection rates at the USPTO from 2005 to 2008 might explain the drop in applications in 
2009. As such, patent application rates may differ systematically from patent litigation rates. 
In a study on litigation costs, BTI Consulting (2009) surveyed general counsels of 
corporate firms, who stated that they planned to reduce spending on intellectual property suits 
by about 7.7 percent in the wake of the recent economic downturn. This budgetary reduction 
was the largest estimated spending decrease among several categories, topping corporate 
transactions, intellectual property transactions (as opposed to litigation), environmental law, 
and general litigation. According to BTI’s CEO: “The thing that surprised me was just the 
wholesale drop in IP litigation, because that market had really been growing dramatically.” 
And while Fulbright & Jaworski’s (2009) Litigation Trends Survey reported that 15 percent of 
its corporate respondents stated that intellectual property/patents accounted for the largest 
litigation increase for them attributable to the changes in the economy, overall, respondents 
reported that they expected to file or be defendants in fewer patent infringement suits in the 
following 12 months. However, neither study investigated the effect of the economy on the 
overall rate of patent litigation. Moreover, decreased spending on patent litigation may not 
necessarily lead to fewer total lawsuits filed—rather, firms may simply spend less per lawsuit. 
Additionally, the BTI (2009) and Fulbright & Jaworski (2009) surveys focused on large 
corporate firms.
21
 Because a substantial number of suits are filed by smaller firms, particularly 
nonpracticing entities (NPEs) that do not sell products or services,
22
 these surveys may not 
reflect more global trends. Finally, the results of these spending surveys may be endemic to 
the nature of the most recent recession. As such, while instructive, they are far from definitive 
on the topic of discussion. 
In a more general study of civil litigation, Bachmeier et al. (2003) find that 
consumption, output, and inflation are each statistically significant, countercyclical predictors 
of total federal civil and bankruptcy litigation filing rates from the years 1960-2000.
23
 In a 
                                                 
21
 The overseas law firm, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, conducted a similar survey of large corporate 
firms in Europe and the United States, and found that 38 percent of firms were more likely to assert 
“IP rights” against “third parties,” and 52 percent had “no change” in their assertions plans 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2009). However, like the surveys by BTI and Fulbright & Jaworski, 
this survey focused on large corporations. Moreover, the survey did not specifically examine patent 
enforcement. Finally, the survey failed to examine actual litigation trends. 
22
 See Ball & Kesan (2009, 29) (finding that over 50 percent of patent infringement suits are filed by 
small firms—namely, those with revenues of less than $10 million per year),  Chien (2013) (showing 
the increasing incidence of suits by NPEs),  Patent Freedom (2013) (same). 
23
 However, anecdotal reports indicate that like patent litigation, in the most recent recession, overall 
civil filings were down (Haynes, 2009). 
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similar vein, Siegelman and Donohue (1995) find a negative relationship between economic 
health and the number of employment-related lawsuits filed.
24
 To the extent that patent 
litigation may differ significantly from other forms of civil litigation, this work does not 
resolve the debate over the special case of patent litigation. In this regard, patent litigation is 
especially noteworthy to study because of its overall importance to the economy. Some recent 
studies estimate that the economic impact of U.S. patent litigation may be as large as $80 
billion per year
25
 and the overall rate of U.S. patent litigation has been growing rapidly over 
the past 20 years.
26
 
 In view of this important lacuna in the literature, we decided to undertake a rigorous 
empirical analysis of standard macroeconomic indicators and their relationship to patent 
litigation filing rates.  
 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL APPROACH 
  
A.  Patent Litigation Filing Data 
  
Our focus in this study is to determine the relationship between macroeconomic indicators 
and the rate of new patent litigation filings in federal district courts.
27
 For filings, we use 
quarterly counts for court-identified “patent” actions filed from January 1, 1971, through 
December 31, 2009.
28
 For the period January 1, 1971, through December 31, 1996, we use 
case counts as compiled by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),
29
 which is “the education and 
research agency for the federal courts.”
30
 For the period January 1, 1997 through December 
                                                 
24
 See also Donohue and Siegelman (1991). 
25
 See Bessen et al. (2012). Although there are reasons to doubt that the overall impact of patent 
litigation is as large as Bessen et al. (2012) estimate, see, e.g., Kesan and Schwartz (2014), nobody 
has argued that it is not considerable. 
26
 See Figure 1. 
27
 In future work, we hope to examine the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and filings in 
the International Trade Commission (ITC) as well as in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC), the duration and intensity of litigation, and the effects on case outcomes, including 
settlement and damages values. 
28
 We did not continue our time series beyond 2009 for two reasons. First, a large number of “false 
marking” suits were filed in 2010 and the first half of 2011, and we could not easily determine counts 
of these suits for this 18-month period nor for prior periods. See Ratanen (2011). Second, changes in 
the recently passed America Invents Act that went into effect in Q3-2011—which made it more 
difficult for patentees to join multiple defendants in one lawsuit—substantially increased the number 
of separate lawsuits overnight. See Chien (2013). Because we did not have access to the total number 
of defendants back to 1971, we could not compare the pre- and post-AIA defendant counts. 
29
 See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases Integrated Database, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
30
 See Federal Judicial Center homepage, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited July 29, 2009). 
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31, 2009, we compiled data from the FJC (through mid-2007) as well as from the federal 
judiciary’s PACER electronic docketing and filing system.
31
  
The FJC compiles data from the Administrative Office (AO) of the Courts, which 
purportedly classifies all filed federal cases.
32
 Those data include nearly all patent cases, since 
no affirmative patent actions can be filed in state court,
33
 and it appears that very few 
counterclaims are brought in state court.
34
 By using the AO’s classifications, we generated 
quarterly counts of newly filed patent cases from 1971 through mid-2007.
35
 Additionally, the 
AO manages the PACER docketing system, which contains dockets from most of the federal 
courts,
36
 especially since 1997.
37
 Interestingly, at the time we collected our data, PACER 
reported higher numbers of patent cases than were found in the raw FJC data for cases filed in 
2002 and later. After examining the FJC and PACER data more carefully, we determined that 
the PACER data were more complete than the raw FJC data for these years, apparently 
because of time lags in collecting and tabulating a full set of data at the FJC.
38
 As such, in our 
analysis we used FJC counts from 1971 through 2002, and PACER counts from 2003 through 
the end of 2009.
39
   
                                                 
31
 PACER stands for “Public Access to Court Electronic Records” and is available at 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/. 
32
 See Eisenberg and Schlanger (2003, 1462-63). 
33
 See 35 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
34
 See Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 2002). Recently, the America 
Invents Act eliminated even counterclaim patent actions from being filed in state court. See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. Law 112-29. § 19(a), 125 Stat. 331 (2011). 
35
 Although FJC data was available through the end of 2008, since the numbers were far less than those 
reported in PACER (see below), we did not believe that the FJC had finished its data collection 
process for those quarters, so we truncated our AO sample. 
36
 For differences between the AO compiled data and the PACER data, especially regarding the 
“coding” of case outcomes, see Eisenberg and Schlanger (2003), Hadfield (2004), and Beebe (2006).   
37
 See PACER U.S. Party/Case Index Date Ranges, https://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/range.pl?puid=01248922566 (last visited July 27, 2009). 
38
 In the earlier years, 2002-2004, the differences between the FJC and PACER data are relatively 
minor, on the order of 0.5-1.0 percent, which leads us to believe that the raw FJC and PACER would 
essentially be equivalent after 2003 but for collection lags at the AO and other minor categorization 
differences, which would not affect the results here. 
39
 One shortcoming with both the AO/FJC and PACER data is that they contain Type I errors 
(designating a docket as a patent case when it is not) and Type II errors (failing to designate a docket 
as a patent case when it is). See generally Moore (2003:1507-09 & n.34) (noting “deficiencies in the 
Administrative Office data due to a lack of reporting or inconsistent reporting”). The Stanford IP 
Litigation Clearinghouse (http://www.lexmachina.com) has made a first pass at identifying these 
Type I and Type II errors for patent infringement actions filed from 2000 through 2009 available in 
PACER.  However, using these statistics, we find relatively minor differences between these 
corrected counts and the PACER counts. Indeed, the overall linear correlation factor between the two 
sets of data is 0.98. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, we ran our preliminary statistical tests 
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 Figure 1 shows these annual counts with bars superimposed on the graph for time 
periods during or just following recessionary phases in the U.S. economy. As Figure 1 
indicates, in all but the most recent recession, patent litigation increased during these periods. 
 
Figure 1: Number of patent lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts, 1970-2009 
 
SOURCES: FJC (1970-2002 counts) and PACER (2003-2009 counts). 
 
We also assembled data on the number of patent grants and in-force patents  to use as 
control variables. Figure 2 shows annual patent litigation counts per issued patent (top line) 




Figure 2: Patent lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts per issued U.S. patent, 1970-2009 
                                                                                                                                                        
against both the PACER and Stanford data, and all significant and nonsignificant results were 
substantially identical. Because the PACER/FJC analysis is more easily verifiable, we only report 
those statistics. 
40
 Total patent grants were obtained from the USPTO. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 
– 2013: http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited February 11, 2015). 
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NOTE: Number of U.S. patent lawsuits filed per issued U.S. patent (top line) with magnitude on left y-
axis.  Raw number of U.S. patents issued (bottom line) with magnitude on right y-axis. 
 
 Like Figure 1, the vertical shaded bands represent periods during or just following 
recessions (based on NBER classifications).
41
 Similar to the raw patent litigation counts, 
during these periods patent litigation per patent has increased historically, except during the 
most recent recession. 
Finally, we examined total patent litigation counts per in-force patents—namely, those 
patents that are unexpired and, hence, may be asserted in litigation. In this regard, patents 
either expire 1 years from issuance or 20 years from filing, sometimes extended for a variety 
of reasons.
42
 Additionally, starting in 1980, patents expire for the failure of patentees to pay 
maintenance fees, charged at four, eight, and twelve years after issuance.
43
 Given the 
difficulty of obtaining data on patent term extensions and maintenance fee payments, previous 
scholars have worked with rough estimates of the numbers of in-force patents.
44
  
For this article, we obtained new data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
providing a much more accurate estimate of in-force patents using internal data.
45
 Figure 3 
                                                 
41
 See note 50. 
42
 See generally Bair (2013). 
43
 See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2013), 37 C.F.R. § 1.362 (2014).  
44
 See, e.g., Bessen and Love (2013, 87-88), Crouch (2012), and Kesan et al. (2012).  
45
 The number of in-force patents does not include design and plant patents, but because patent 
litigation overwhelmingly involves utility patents (greater than 90 percent of filed cases, see, e.g., Lex 
Machina, Year in Review, Continued Analysis, https://lexmachina.com/2014/07/year-review-
continued-analysis/) and because utility patents account for 85-95 percent of all issued patents during 
the period of our sample (see U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 40), we believe it is adequate as 
a control against total litigation filings.  In this regard, we also control by an estimate of the total 
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shows the total number of in-force patents from 1971-2009, again with vertical shaded bands 




Figure 3: Total in-force U.S. patents, 1971-2009 
 
SOURCE: Internal USPTO data. 
 
 Like issued patents, there is a sharp uptick in the total number of in-force patents 
starting in the late 1990s. However, unlike patent grants, there is relatively no growth in in-
force patents from the early 1970s through the late 1990s, indicating that an increasing 
percentage of patentees from 1980 through the late 1990s failed to pay maintenance fees.  
 Figure 4 shows annual patent litigation counts per in-force patent (top line through 
2004) superimposed on the raw issued patent counts (bottom line through 2004). 
 
Figure 4: U.S. patent lawsuits per in-force U.S. patent, 1971-2009 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of issued patents, which does include design and plant patents, and obtain similar results to 
our specification using in-force patents.  See Appendix C.  
46
 Previous data on in-force patents have been limited. Crouch (2014) estimates the number of in-force 
utility patents but does not account for regulatory-approval related patent term extensions or the 
impact of litigation, reexamination, review, or reissues.  Comparing the USPTO’s to Crouch’s raw 
data, we find that although Crouch generally underestimates the number of in-force patents, the 
USPTO’s data are typically within 20 percent of Crouch’s estimations for any given year. 
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NOTE: Number of U.S. patent lawsuits filed per in-force U.S. patent (top line through 2004) with 
magnitude on right y-axis.  Number of U.S. patent lawsuits (bottom line through 2004) with 
magnitude on left y-axis. 
 
Two interesting trends appear in this Figure 4. First, unlike patent litigation per issued 
patent, there is a notable increase in overall patent litigation per in-force patent starting in the 
early 1980s and increasing rapidly throughout the 1990s, with a downturn in the 2000s. 
Second, during the downturn periods, prior to 2000, overall patent litigation increased during 
downturns, whereas after 2000, patent litigation decreased during downturns (though, notably, 
against an overall decreasing trend of patent litigation per in-force patent during the 2000s). 
 
B.  Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
Since 1971, the U.S. economy has undergone six recessions: two 16-month recessions in the 
mid-1970s and the early 1980s, a slowdown in the late 1980s/early 1990s as well as the early 
2000s, and the most recent recession, which lasted from the end of 2007 through the middle 
of 2009 (see Table 1).
47
 Additionally, the four decades under consideration in our study 
include two significant economic expansions: the 97-month expansion of the 1980s and the 
10-year expansion from 1991-2001.
48
 This large number of expansions and contractions 
provides a robust data set to test the effects of downturns (and upswings) on filing counts. We 
                                                 
47
 See Bachmeier et al. (2003, p. 194). Additionally, another recession ended in 1970, but since we do 
not have patent litigation data from before 1970, we cannot analyze the effects of this recession.  
48
 Id. 
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The nature of these recessions has varied, especially the last one, which was 





Table 1: Economic Contractions, 1969-2009 
Years Unemployment GDP 
Decline 
Description 
1969-70 6.1% -0.6% Rising inflation; high interest rates 
 
1973-75 9.0% -3.2% High oil prices; high government 
spending; stock market crash; high 














6.3% -0.3% Terrorism and related stock market crash; 
decline in outlays and investments; dot-
com bust 
 
2007-09 10.2% -3.9% High oil prices; real estate & banking 
collapse; credit crunch; high 
unemployment 
SOURCES: Cecchetti et al. (2009); Labonte (2009); Claessens et al. (2009); Knoop (2004); Labonte 
(2002); Estrella and Mishkin (1998); Walsh (1993). 
  
As such, in order to measure the relationship between these recessionary trends and 





 and personal consumption
53
 (important 
                                                 
49
 One might wonder whether there is an endogeneity concern regarding patent litigation and the 
macroeconomy—namely, whether patent litigation can affect the macroeconomy, which in turns 
affects patent litigation.  Based on preliminary work for an in-progress study, the answer is largely 
no—namely, we do not find any statistically significant effect of patent litigation on GDP (Miller & 
Sichelman, 2015).  Although we do find a relatively small significant negative effect of patent 
litigation on total R & D spending over the period 1984-2007, about 2 percent annually on average, at 
least for the study in this article, endogeneity concerns are of no import. 
50
 See Cecchetti et al. (2009), Labonte (2009), Claessens et al. (2008), Estrella and Mishkin (1998). 
51
 For the present version of the study, we analyzed many, but not all, of these indicators. See infra 
Section  IV. A nontrivial portion (about 15 percent) of patent infringement suits are filed by foreign 
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components of real aggregate GDP),
54
 stock market indices (NYSE, S&P 500, NASDAQ),
55
 
the TED spread (the difference between the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the three month T-bill rate; the TED spread is used to measure perceived 
macroeconomic financial risk),
56
 T-bill and real interest rates,
 57
 inflation (as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index),
58
  and the unemployment rate.
59
 Additionally, because previous 
studies have shown a relationship between total patent litigation and the number of issued 
patents,
60
 and as noted above, there is a similar relationship between patent litigation and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
firms (Moore 2003). Although it appears most infringement claims are predicated on domestic 
activity of the accused infringer, foreign economic conditions would affect the decisions of foreign 
plaintiffs to file suit. Here, because of the difficulty of determining the home country of foreign 
plaintiffs, and the relatively small percentage of suits filed by those firms, we use U.S. economic 
conditions as a proxy for foreign conditions. 
52
 Gross Domestic Investment, Quarterly, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/W170RC1Q027SBEA/downloaddata?cid=33037.  For our 
entire analysis, we converted nominal investment and all other monetary variables to real values in 
fourth-quarter 2009 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items 
(hereinafter CPI-U), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCNS/downloaddata?cid=9. 
53
 Personal Consumption Expenditures, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PCEC/downloaddata. 
54
 Nominal GDP, Quarterly, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP/downloaddata.  
55
 The market indices are derived from Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com. Quarterly averages 
were constructed by taking the average of each daily close during the applicable quarter. 
56
 Mortgage-X, http://mortgage-x.com/general/indexes/wsj_libor_history.asp?y=2009 (LIBOR rates); 
Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^IRX (T-bill rates). Specifically, when overall 
financial risk is high, banks tend to charge high rates for unsecured loans, which increases the LIBOR 
rate. At the same time, when financial risk is high, banks desire to hold more Treasury bonds, which 
decreases T-bill rates. Thus, in terms of high financial uncertainty, the TED spread increases. See 
Brunnermeier (2009). 
57
 Real interest rates are calculated by taking the T-bill rates and subtracting the Consumer Price Index. 
See Caporale and Grier (2005: 86). 
58
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items, CPIAUCNS, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCNS/downloaddata?cid=9.  There have been some 
changes in the methodology used to calculate the CPI, and the CPI-U-RS series uses the current 
methodology throughout the series.  See generally CPI Research Series Using Current Methods (CPI-
U-RS), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpirsdc.htm.  Unfortunately, the RS series starts in 1978, so we chose 
to use the CPI-U series.  However, we did run some alternative specifications using the RS series 
(available from the authors upon request) for later subperiods in our dataset and found similar results 
to those presented here. 
59
Unemployment,UNRATE, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE/downloaddata?cid=12. 
Quarterly rates are derived by averaging over three monthly rates. 
60
 See, e.g., Cook (2007). 
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number of in-force patents, we used the quarterly issued and in-force patent counts from the 
USPTO as control variables.
61
 For good measure, we included quarterly R & D as an 
additional control variable.
62
 We also included several lags of these variables to account for 
the delay with which the changes may propagate through the economy.  
Finally, we also used patent litigation itself in previous quarters as a control variable to 
compensate for potential autocorrelation as well as background increases or decreases in 
patent litigation due to changes in case law, such as the recent eBay v. MercExchange 
decision, which made injunctive relief more difficult to obtain, possibly reducing the value of 
patent litigation;
63
 changes in patent law institutions, such as the creation of the Federal 
Circuit in 1982, which arguably made patent litigation more valuable;
64
 general changes in 
attorney compensation; and the like.
65
 Specifically, by adopting this approach, our regressions 
show the short-term effects of macroeconomic variables on patent litigation rates from 
quarter-to-quarter relative to the longitudinal, background changes in patent litigation rates 
(primarily increases) caused by other factors. Thus, our method isolates the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on patent litigation. 
 
C.  Statistical Methods 
 
We estimate a linear regression between the total number of cases filed in each quarter and 
several macroeconomic variables. We employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, where 
each variable is specified as a function of its own lags and the lags of the other variables.
66
 
                                                 
61
 United States Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image Database, Advanced 
Search, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (issued patents) (last visited July 2, 
2010); see also infra note 75. We did not control for the technology class of the litigated patents, 
because we did not have a sufficiently representative set of patent numbers for the lawsuits in our 
dataset. 
62
 We obtained total annual U.S. R&D spending from the National Science Board’s 2014 Science and 
Engineering Indicators report, Appendix Table 4.2 “ U.S. R&D expenditures, by all sectors and all 
sources of funds: 1953-2011”, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/index.cfm/appendix.  . 
Unfortunately, there is no reported quarterly series of total U.S. R&D spending so we extrapolated 
quarterly seasonally adjusted values from the National Science Board’s data using the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’s narrower quarterly industrial R&D series, National Income and Product 
Accounts Tables, Table 5.3.5. Private Fixed Investment by Type, line 18 “Research and 
development,” available at 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=145. 
63
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
64
 See Atkinson et al. (2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit decreased invalidation findings relative to 
the pre-1982 regional circuit outcomes). 
65
 On the other hand, as discussed earlier, we did attempt to avoid very sharp changes in patent litigation 
caused by the sudden rise of false marking suits and the passage of the America Invents Act, as our 
model would have difficultly discerning the effects of these sharp changes on patent litigation from 
macroeconomic effects. See note 28. 
66
 For a review of the VAR method, see Hamilton (1994). 
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More formally, our VAR model describes the evolution of a set of k variables over the 
same sample period (t = 1, …, T) as a linear function of only their past values.  The variables 
are collected in a k x 1 vector yt, with the ith element, yi,t, equal to the time t observation of the 
ith variable.  For example, if the ith variable is patent litigation, then yi,t is the value of patent 
litigation at time t. 
 
A p-th order reduced VAR, denoted VAR(p), is:  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 +  … +  𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡, 
 
where yt-1, is an observation l-periods in the past and called the lth lag of y, c is a k x 1 vector 
of intercepts, Ai is a time-invariant k x k matrix and et is a k x 1 vector of error terms.  A pth-
order VAR is also called a VAR with p lags.
68
 Thus, the reduced form of our seven-lag main 
specification, reported in Table 2, is: 
 





Following common practice, we use logged values for all levels (GDP, investment, 
consumption, market indices, etc.) and actual values for rates (inflation, interest rates, and 
unemployment).  Additionally, we difference all variables (except for inflation) to ensure 
stationarity based on unit root tests.
69
 Time-series variables depend on their own histories; 
thus, it is critical to determine the lag structure of the model. Our data are quarterly, so a one-
period lag corresponds with a one-quarter lag. Using standard criteria, we determined that the 
optimal approach was two-fold, a short-lag model and a long-lag model.
70
 Overall, the results 
                                                 
67
 Nonstationarity indicates that any short run shocks become permanent, as in the case of a pure 
“random walk.” See Wang (2009). 
68
 See Hamilton (1994). 
†
 In our main specification yt is a 10-by-1 vector of values of patent litigation, investment, consumption, 
unemployment, the real interest rate, R & D, in-force patents, inflation, NASDAQ, and the TED 
spread all during quarter t.  yt-1 through yt-7 are similar vectors containing the values of these variables 
during the previous seven quarters.  A1 through A7  contain the estimated coefficients on each variable 
for each lag, one through seven quarters. [Authors’ Note: This footnote was mistakenly deleted in 
printing the forthcoming article in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.] 
69
 Stationarity is required for VAR models. The fact that the variables are stationary over time ensures 
that underlying time trends are accounted for. Formally, unit root tests show that only inflation is 
stationary without differencing, i.e., it is I(0). All other variables are found to be stationary in 
differences, i.e., they are “trend stationary,” or I(1). Thus, differences are used in the estimation. 
(Campbell & Perron (1991, 143-145). 
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of the short-lag model were not as highly significant as the long-lag model. As such, we 
report on the seven-period lag model. (The results of the one-period lag model are available in 
Appendix A.)  
 
 
IV.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: CHANGES IN PATENT LITIGATION DEPEND ON THE SPECIFIC 
NATURE OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation.
71
 The first specification shows the results of the 
seven-quarter model for the entire time period (1971-2009), the second specification shows 
the results during the period 1971-1991, and the third specification shows the results during 
the period 1986-2009. It may seem odd to include two overlapping time periods. However, 
because of our seven-lag model and the large number of variables of concern, soaking up a 
large number of degrees of freedom, the shortest period of comparison during the earlier years 
was of necessity 20 years.
72
 (We report the results from other periods and for a smaller 
number of variables in Appendix B.)
73
  
We find that some factors are consistently significant across the models and lags in 
their direction of impact on litigation volume, though the magnitude varied according to the 
specification. Other variables were significant, but of alternating direction depending on the 
time lag between the variable of interest and the volume of patent litigation cases.  
 














S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.11  -0.81 ***  0.13 






0.17  -0.74 ***  0.12 
  






0.19  -0.62 ***  0.13 
                                                                                                                                                        
70
 Two standard criteria were used to determine the optimal number of lags: the Aikaike information 
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The AIC and BIC are standard statistics 
based on the log likelihood of the estimated model and the number of parameters estimated by the 
model. The AIC invariantly pointed to longer lags and the BIC indicated shorter lags (Chizi & 
Maimon (2010,  96). 
71
 Note that we only present the equation where current patent litigation is the dependent variable. The 
full simultaneous equations results are available upon request. 
72
 Moreover, we found that for all of the variables showing significance (we report variables showing 
no or low significance in the appendices), the period 1986-2009 showed substantially stronger trends 
than alternative time periods. As we note below, we believe there was a shift in the nature of patent 
litigation that began sometime in the mid-1980s, which could likely explain these differences. 
73
 We determined that the optimal lag structure for these shorter-period models was four lags. Because 
the shorter-period models allowed a much smaller number of macroeconomic variables given the 
lower number of degrees of freedom, the results generally did not show the levels of significance of 
the longer-period models. Additionally, because of the smaller number of variables, this led to greater 
omitted variable bias, making the results much more difficult to interpret. As such, we do not rely on 
these results.  
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0.20  -0.43 **  0.15 
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0.40  -0.28   0.73 
  
























0.41  -1.99 **  0.77 
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1.16  -3.75   3.17 
  
























1.47  0.27 
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0.04  -0.04 
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0.04  0.20 **  0.07 






0.01  -0.02   0.03 
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0.01  -0.13 ***  0.04 
  














0.01  0.10 *  0.05 
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0.87  -1.63   1.04 
 








































0.81  0.38 
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0.64  -0.24 
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3.31  1.39 
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3.39  -0.67   2.11 
  






3.37  -3.58   2.56 
  




















































0.03  -0.25 ***  0.08 
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0.02  -0.24 ***  0.08 






0.08  -0.23 **  0.11 
 
















































0.11  0.06 
 
 0.16 
TED spread diff 1 
         
 -0.14 ***  0.04 
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 -0.11 **  0.05 
  
5 
         
 -0.11 **  0.05 
  
6 
         
 0.09 *  0.04 
  
7 
         













    
76 
   




    
-37.1 
   




    
-19.5 
   
 -14.2    
 
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  156 quarters from 1971 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Interestingly, across the entire time period of 1971-2009, other than patent litigation 
and consumption, none of the macroeconomic variables were consistently significant. This 
may seem odd because many variables were significant—and in the same cyclical or 
countercyclical direction—in the sub-divided time periods. For instance, R & D was 
positively correlated to patent litigation counts in both subperiods, but had little  statistical 
significance across the entire 40-year time period and the significance that does exist is 
negative. However, it is important to recall that VAR models are sensitive to interperiod 
changes. Thus, the differing effects of time lags in each subperiod may effectively “cancel out” 
significance in each subperiod when examining the entire time period. Additionally, each 
variable in a VAR model acts as a control, such that the regression measures only the residual 
effect of a variable taking into account other variables. As several variables have differing 
effects in the early and later subperiods, these competing tendencies also diminish the 
significance of other variables over the entire time period (e.g., R & D). 
A number of indicators showed statistical significance in each subperiod. In terms of 
the lagged dependent variable (patent litigation counts), lags of previous patent litigation 
counts have a consistently negative effect on current litigation. This implies that a one-period 
positive “shock” in patent litigation will generally lead to lower litigation in the following 
period. Based on the experience of one of the authors, managers at firms tend to make 
decisions to file patent suits over relatively long periods of time, usually three months to a 
year or longer. We believe this helps to explain our patent litigation “shock” finding—namely, 
if a given quarter has a relatively high rate of filings simply because of random hazard within 
a longer overall decision period, one would expect that all else equal, the next quarter would 
contain a lower number of case filings. In this regard, although large numbers of patent suits 
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are filed each quarter (roughly 250 to 750 in our dataset), they  numbers are not large enough 
to eliminate significant random quarter-to-quarter variation over the lengthy time period 
during which managers make decisions to file suit. 
Most of the other significant indicators were generally consistent across the two time 
periods (in terms of the sign of the coefficients) when the coefficients were statistically 
significant, though as we describe below, some notable ones differed in sign from the earlier 
to the later period. Additionally, most of the indicators were “unidirectional” in the sense that 
the sign of the regression coefficient was the same or nearly the same across all time lags, for 
statistically significant coefficients. That is, the indicator was consistently either cyclically or 
countercyclically correlated with patent litigation counts, or the magnitude of the coefficients 
is such that the total effect is primarily cyclical or countercyclical.  
There was one unidirectional indicator with primarily consistent results across both 
time periods: 
 
 Domestic R & D  (procyclical) 
 
Other indicators were significant and unidirectional in both subperiods, but of different 
directions in each subperiod: 
 
 Investment (procyclical in earlier period; countercyclical in later period)74 
 Unemployment (countercyclical in earlier period; procyclical in the later 
period) 
 
Other indicators were significant and unidirectional only in one subperiod: 
 
 Consumption (procyclical in earlier period) 
 In-force patents (countercyclical in earlier period)75 
 NASDAQ index (countercyclical in earlier period) 
 TED spread (procyclical in the later period)76 
 
Finally, some indicators showed statistical significance over multiple lags, sometimes the 
coefficient was positive and other times negative: 
 
 NASDAQ (in the later period) 
                                                 
74
 As we discuss below, in an alternative specification, overall GDP showed similar trends to 
investment. See infra Section IV.B. 
75
 We ran an alternative specification based on quarterly patent grants during the years 1971-2009. In 
this specification, there were no substantial differences in results from the primary specification 
(Appendix C).  
76
 As LIBOR was only implemented in 1986, we only included the TED spread in the later period 
regression. Because interactions between this extra variable and those common to the three 
specifications in Table 2 could theoretically change the sign or significance of the common variables 
in the later period, we ran the later period specification excluding the TED spread.  We report those 
results in Appendix D and find they are consistent with the later period results in Table 2. 
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 Real interest rate (in both periods) 
 Inflation (in both periods)  
 
These results are summarized in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Trends of Macroeconomic Variables  
Independent 





Patent litigation Countercyclical Countercyclical 
R&D Procyclical Procyclical 
Investment Procyclical Countercyclical 
Unemployment Countercyclical Procyclical 
Real interest rate Competing trends Competing trends 
Consumption Procyclical No significant trends 
In-force patents Countercyclical No significant trends 
NASDAQ index Countercyclical Competing trends 
TED Spread n/a Procyclical 
Inflation Competing trends Competing trends 
NOTE: Trends with respect to patent litigation rates (based on results in Table 2). 
 
Following standard practice in VAR analysis, we performed Granger-causality tests to 
determine the robustness of our results in Table 2.
77
 Granger-causality statistics examine 
whether lagged values of one variable help predict another variable. If, for example, 
investment does not help predict patent litigation, then the coefficients on the lags of 
investment in the reduced-form patent litigation equation will all be zero.
78
   
 
We performed separate Granger-causality tests for each of the three time periods used 
in Table 2 and report these results in Appendix E. Again, few of our macroeconomic variables 
appear to explain patent litigation across the entire time period 1971-2009.  However, for both 
of the shorter periods, most of the variables of interest in our primary specification are 
significant predictors of patent litigation (see Appendix E).
79
 Below we briefly discuss our 
results of the significant indicators. 
 
A.  Unidirectional Indicators 
 
Seven indicators—investment, NASDAQ index, unemployment, consumption, TED spread, 
domestic R & D, and in-force patents—were statistically significant across multiple lags and 
unidirectional in one or both subperiods. Two of these indicators were countercyclical in the 
sense that in times of economic expansion these indicators were associated with decreases in 
                                                 
77




 The exceptions were consumption and in-force patents (in the later subperiod). See Appendix E. 
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patent litigation, and vice-versa in times of economic contraction. Specifically, the NASDAQ 
index generally showed countercyclical correlations, particularly in the earlier subperiod (i.e., 
1971-1991).
80
 Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the NASDAQ led to approximately a 0.4 
percent decrease in patent litigation two quarters later in the earlier subperiod.
81
 In-force 
patents also showed countercyclical trends, but only in the earlier subperiod. 
On the other hand, domestic R & D, consumption (in the earlier period), and the TED 
spread (in the later period
82
) were cyclical in nature. For R & D, a 1 percent increase in the 
prior quarter implied a 4.2 percent increase in patent litigation one quarter later in the earlier 
subperiod and a 2.1 percent increase three quarters later in the later subperiod. For 
consumption, a 1 percent increase implied a 2.8 percent increase in patent litigation one 
period later and a 4.1 percent increase two periods later in the earlier subperiod. For the TED 
spread, a 1 percent increase implied a 1.1 percent decrease in patent litigation four quarters 
later in the later subperiod.
83
  
Finally, investment showed procyclical trends in the earlier subperiod, but 
countercyclical trends in the later subperiod. A 1 percent increase in the earlier period led to a 
1.3 percent increase in litigation seven quarters later, while a 1 percent increase in the later 
period led to 2.0 percent decrease in litigation six quarters later. Conversely, unemployment 
showed countercyclical trends in the earlier subperiod, but procyclical trends in the later 
subperiod. A 1 percent increase in the unemployment in the earlier period implied a 0.4 
percent increase in patent litigation three quarters later and a 0.17 percent increase seven 
quarters later. However, in the later subperiod, A 1 percent increase implied a 0.35 percent 
decrease in patent litigation two quarters later.  
 
B.  Bidirectional Indicators 
 
For the earlier subperiod, inflation was negatively correlated with patent litigation in some 
quarters but positively correlated in other quarters, with coefficients around the same order of 
magnitude. Similarly, NASDAQ in the later subperiod showed countercyclical effects in 
quarters 1 and 3 but procyclical effects for quarters 2 and 4. Real interest rates and inflation 
displayed similar oscillatory activity in both subperiods. To be certain we found similar 
intralag period oscillations for several other indicators, but the magnitudes of the coefficients 
were such that the trends pointed in one direction or the other overall. However, to correct for 
these intralag period oscillations—as well as to account for the large number of degrees of 
freedom used by our main specification—we performed additional analysis.  
First, we ran the main specification with fewer independent variables, which reduced 
the number of degrees of freedom used in the regressions (see Appendices D, F and G). 
                                                 
80
 In an alternative model, the S&P 500 and Dow Jones indices yielded similar results, though the Dow 
Jones index provided no meaningful significant effects in the later subperiod. 
81
 There were procyclical, significant correlations for the NASDAQ in the earlier subperiods, but these 
were much smaller than the countercyclical correlations.  
82
 To be certain, we only measured the TED spread in the later period. See supra note 76. 
83
 Because the TED spread was not logged, it was necessary to reinterpret the coefficients via 
exponentiation to determine their relationship to the overall change in patent litigation. 
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Although most of these specifications did not eliminate intralag period oscillations, they were 
routinely consistent with our primary specification. For instance, eliminating the TED spread 
in the later subperiod produces the same overall results as our main specification (and, 
moreover, shows a countercyclical rather than an ambiguous trend for real interest rates) (see 
Appendix D). Other permutations of fewer variables show similar results, including a 
countercyclical trend for real interest rates in the later subperiod (see Appendix F). For 
example, by replacing investment and consumption with GDP, we found similar results to our 
main specification (see Appendix G).
84
 In this regard, GDP showed procyclical trends in the 
earlier subperiod and countercyclical trends in the later period, consistent with the trends of 
investment in the main specification. In three other specifications, we eliminated the 
NASDAQ index, then removed in-force patents, then finally removed consumption. Again, 
these alternative specifications produced results consistent with those of our main 
specification (see Appendix F).  
Second, as we noted above, we ran a specification with a one-quarter lag, though we 
did not find this model led to many highly significant results, making it of limited usefulness 
(see Appendix A).
85
 Third, we used four-quarter trailing averages of each variable of interest 
in an attempt to “smear” out these intralag period effects. Unfortunately, these results 
generally led to bidirectional indicators for the same variables as the main specification, and 
the “lag upon lag” effect produced confounding results (see Appendix H).  
Fourth, we calculated impulse response functions (IRFs), which are used in time series 
analyses to estimate the effects of exogenous shocks on a dependent variable, here the change 
in overall patent litigation.
86
 However, unlike our primary specification, which examines how 
specific changes in macroeconomic variables correspond to changes in patent litigation, IRFs 
use a one standard deviation shock—that is, one standard deviation more than the average 
change in a variable of interest across a given time period—of the independent variables in 
order measure how “unexpected changes” affect a dependent variable.
87
 Roughly, IRFs 
measure the shocks coming from the error term related to the underlying independent 
variables of interest, in order to determine how these shocks affect the dependent variable.
88
 
We employed a bivariate regression model using the variables of interest in our main 
specification over the entire time period and during each subperiod, recalculating the optimal 
number of lags for each variable.
89
 For example, the IRF for the real interest rate during the 
later subperiod (1986-2009) is shown in Figure 5 below. 
                                                 
84
 A few variables, particularly in-force patents and the TED spread (in the later subperiod) lost 
significant and clear trends in this alternative specification, but these results do not contradict the 
significant and clear trends of the primary specification for these variables. 
85
 Those results that were significant were largely consistent with those of the main specification (see 
Appendix A). 
86
 See generally Cain (2011). 
87




 Specifically, we calculated orthogonal impulse response functions over 16 quarters. Tabular results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 5: Effect of real interest shock on patent litigation for Table 2 VAR, 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid lines represent the orthogonalized impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter 
(horizontal axis) to a one standard deviation shock to the real interest rate in quarter zero.  Vertical 
axis measures the percent change in patent litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five 
percent confidence intervals in gray. 
 
In Figure 5, the vertical axis shows the overall change in patent litigation from a one 
standard deviation shock at a given time (Step 0) in the real interest rate, and shows the 
change in patent litigation as a percentage as that shock progresses over each subsequent 
quarter (represent as a step on the horizontal axis). The gray shading displays the 95 percent 
confidence level relative to the orthogonalized IRF measure, depicted as a black line. 
Unfortunately, like the results in Figure 5, most of the IRF results (see Appendix I), were too 
noisy to provide any useful information. In particular, they showed no clear procyclical or 
countercyclical trends within the 95 percent confidence level over a given time period of 
interest. Notably, because the IRFs essentially measure the effects of the error term of the 
variables of interest—roughly “unexpected” shocks—the IRF results may diverge 
substantially from those of the underlying trends related to the variables of interest as 
measured by the coefficients of the vector autoregression (VAR). In other words, the lack of 
clear trends in the IRFs indicates that any “noise” in the changes in the underlying 
macroeconomic variables has no clear procyclical or countercyclical effect in the rates of 
patent litigation.  
Fifth, in contrast to the IRFs, we performed simple, bivariate time series regressions 
against each variable of interest over 14 separate time periods representing nonrecessionary 
and recessionary periods respectively, with the variables of interest averaged over each time 
period (using patent litigation counts as a control variable to normalize for time periods of 
different lengths). Many of these results were significant and, importantly, generally 
consistent with the findings of our primary model (see Appendix J). For instance, a 1 percent 
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Overall, we believe these additional specifications show that our results are 
sufficiently robust and not caused by overfitting. Moreover, these results indicate that the 
intralag period effects found in our primary specification for some of our variables are 
generally of little import when examining overall trends.  
 
 
V.  REFLECTIONS AND CAVEATS 
 
A.  The Data Support Both Explanations of Downturns and Filing Rates for Recent Patent 
Litigation Trends 
 
As we described in Section I, there are two prominent causal theories held by practicing 
lawyers regarding the effects of economic downturns on patent litigation rates. First, some 
lawyers believe that downturns reduce patent litigation by constraining the available capital 
needed to fund litigation (“capital constraint” theory). Second, other lawyers believe that 
downturns increase litigation by making it more attractive relative to returns on selling 
products and services (“substitution” theory).  
Our results indicate that neither theory was likely at work, at least to any substantial 
degree, in the early subperiod (1971-1991). However, for the later subperiod (1986-2009), our 
results are partly consistent with both explanations—namely, depending on the type of 
downturn, patent litigation rates may rise or fall.  
As a preliminary matter, one indicator—R & D—showed procyclical trends across 
both subperiods. One would expect that as absolute R & D increased, overall patent litigation 
would eventually rise. In our model, because we controlled for overall long-term increases in 
patent litigation, increased R & D is more of a measure of patent litigation density, namely, 
that as R & D rises, there is more patent litigation per R & D dollar.
91
 Thus, it appears not 
only has patent litigation increased with the rise in overall R & D, but it has increased more 
and more quickly as R & D has increased over time.  
Other than R & D, we generally found quite different trends in the earlier subperiod 
compared with the later subperiod. Starting with the earlier subperiod, investment and 
consumption showed procyclical trends. Yet, NASDAQ was countercyclical in the earlier 
period, though with much weaker effects than investment and consumption. Real interest rates 
had little overall effect.
92
 As such, our general view is that neither the substitution nor the 
capital constraint theory played substantial roles during the bulk of the earlier time period. 
                                                 
    We also divided the 14 periods into two subperiods—one from 1970-1991 and another from 1983-
2009, which roughly matched the length of the subperiods in our primary model. Because of the short 
periods and hence few degrees of freedom, only one result was clearly significant (investment in the 
later subperiod, which was countercyclical at a 95 percent confidence level). 
91
 Like the NASDAQ indicator, we found that this trend weakened, perhaps even reversed in the latest 
period (1997-2009), again, potentially a result of increasing NPE-driven litigation (see Appendix B). 
92
 Real interest rates showed no clear effects in the primary specification and weakly procyclical effects 
in some alternative specifications in the earlier subperiod. 
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Rather, generally speaking, as consumption and investment increased, the overall number of 
patent lawsuits increased. As we explain further below, to the extent there was a shift starting 
in the mid-1980s from competitor versus competitor litigation to licensing-driven litigation 
filed by non-competitors, these early trends are sensible. Namely, as consumption and 
investment increase, overall infringement increases, and thereby patentholders become more 
likely to sue their competitors. Because these competitor-driven suits are generally not funded 
via external financing, it is sensible that real interest rates have little to no effect. The weak 
relationship of NASDAQ declines to increases in patent litigation perhaps shows a mild 
substitution effect, but nothing remarkable.
93
 So, overall, it appears that patent litigation in 
this early period was not particularly prone to macroeconomic forces, other than as a proxy 
for the overall amount of infringement fundamentally occurring on a microeconomic level. 
In contrast, the later subperiod trends indicate that macroeconomic forces per se 
played an important role. Notably, investment—which was procyclical in the earlier 
subperiod—is strongly countercyclical in the later subperiod. Similarly, our alternative 
specification shows strongly procyclical trends for real aggregate GDP in the earlier 
subperiods but strong counter-cyclical trends in the later subperiod (Appendix G). Of course, 
decreases in overall productivity and output are generally associated with decreased returns 
on investment in products and services. As such, following downturns in the later subperiod, 
it appears the substitution theory was at work. Namely, patent litigation rates rose as 
managers at firms chose to channel capital into launching patent litigation (or, alternatively, as 
investors shifted their investments from traditional firms to ones that routinely engage in 
patent litigation and licensing, such as NPEs), rather than ordinary products and services. 
So far in our explanation of the later subperiod it appears the substitution theory is 
correct and the capital constraint theory is not. Namely, based on the above analysis, increases 
in patent litigation in the later subperiod all seem to be strongly correlated to declining firm 
revenues from products and services and outside investment. Yet, in the later subperiod, we 
also found a competing trend. Specifically, we found primarily that as real interest rates rose, 
patent litigation rates declined. Additionally, as the TED spread widened—a measure of 
economy-wide financial risk—near-term patent litigation rates fell consistently over many 
quarters. These results are consistent with the capital constriction theory. Namely, as the TED 
spread rises—which it did  substantially in the most recent recession—raising capital becomes 
increasingly difficult. Similarly, as real interest rates rise, capital generally becomes more 
costly. Presumably, as capital constricts with rises in the TED spread and real interest rates, 
firms reduce spending on patent litigation, leading to overall decreases in filing rates. 
In our belief, the clue to interpreting these changing time trends is the changing nature 
of patent litigation. Especially starting in the mid-1980s and increasingly over time, firms 
have brought patent litigation suits not so much to stem competition, but to earn licensing fees 
on patents they do not practice.
94
 Part of this trend may reflect the strengthening of patents by 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which was created in 1982.
95
 Texas Instruments and 
IBM were early pioneers in this licensing-driven approach, each reportedly generating 
                                                 
93
 Similarly, unemployment in the earlier subperiod showed very small overall effects.  
94
 See sources cited in  note 13. 
95
 See Atkinson et al. (2009). 
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roughly $500 million to $1 billion in annual licensing revenue by the mid- to late-1990s from 
their patents, many of which they apparently did not practice.
96
 Several years later, 
nonpracticing entities (NPEs)—roughly speaking, firms that sell no products or services, and 
generally perform little to no R & D—entered the fray, particularly in the fields of software 
and financial methods.
97
 Like the licensing-driven business model of operating companies, the 
NPE trend was arguably enabled in large part—at least early on—by the Federal Circuit’s 
1990s decisions providing broad leeway for of patenting for software and business methods.
98
 
Importantly, NPE litigation is often driven by contingent-fee attorneys, funded by outside 
capital sources.
99
 Thus, as litigation has transformed into an investment-driven enterprise, it is 




In sum, from the 1970s through at least the mid-1980s, economic downturns played 
little to no role other than as a proxy for overall private infringement. Specifically, during this 
period, as private infringement increased, so did the number of lawsuits, and vice-versa. 
However, contrary to recent anecdotal accounts and limited study, more recent economic 
downturns have not definitively increased or decreased patent litigation rates. Rather, 
depending on the nature of the downturn, it appears patent litigation may either increase or 
decrease following a downturn.  
Specifically, if the downturn is characterized by severe constraints on capital and 
financing—such as the most recent one—then it is much more likely that patent litigation 
rates will decrease. Indeed, just prior to and during the last recession, the TED spread more 
than quadrupled at its peak, very likely substantially constraining overall patent litigation 
counts. During the same time period, GDP remained fairly stable. Thus, while a 1 percent 
drop in GDP was associated with steep declines in patent litigation two quarters later—about 
4.5 percent—in a severe credit crunch, procyclical capital constraint effects may dominate 
                                                 
96
 See Barnett (2011); Somaya and Teece (2007), Rivette and Klein (2000), and Grindley and Teece 
(1997). In this regard, our procyclical real interest rate trends show strong significance beginning as 
early as 1994 in our alternative specifications (see Appendix B). Thus, these trends likely cannot be 
explained merely by the rise of non-practicing entities (NPEs).  
97
 See sources cited in note 13. 
98
 See Meurer (2008). 
99
 See Ewing (2012) and Schwartz (2012). Longer- term (six to seven quarters out) TED spreads were 
positively correlated with litigation rates in the later subperiod. However, the availability of 
immediate credit is likely to be of the greatest concern to contingent-fee lawyers, supporting the 
inference that TED spreads are generally negatively correlated with the decision to initiate patent 
infringement suits. Additionally, in the 14-period alternative specification, increases in the TED 
spread were significantly correlated with decreases in patent litigation during the period 1983-2009, 
supporting this interpretation. 
100
 We would have liked to test this claim empirically, but we did not have data on the number of NPE 
or licensing-driven suits filed on a quarterly basis during the relevant time periods. The only publicly 
available data on the number of lawsuits filed by NPEs over any significant time period is from RPX 
and PatentFreedom, which have tracked the annual filing of NPE suits since 2000. We have concerns 
regarding the overall accuracy of these data, but even if  they were accurate, unfortunately it would 
provide an insufficient number of data points to generate meaningful results.  
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countercyclical substitution effects.  However, if the downturn is characterized by substantial 
declines in productivity and relatively mild constrictions in available capital, then it is very 
likely for litigation counts to increase. This latter result likely reflects the increased relative 
return on investment from litigation when the sales of products and services slump.  
 
B.  Caveats 
 
Because the patent litigation process is exceedingly complex—and much remains to be 
discovered about its underlying mechanisms—we lacked a baseline functional form with 
which to compare our results. Although we tried to overcome these limitations through a 
reduced form analysis as well as alternative specifications, with so many variables and lags 
the number of possible regressions quickly becomes immense, and these techniques can only 
capture only a portion of the potential permutations.  Thus, while our analysis adds to the 
literature, it may overlook some of the nuanced interactions among various macroeconomic 
variables vis-à-vis the volume of patent litigation. 
Additionally, because we focus on the macroeconomic indicators rather than micro-
level data, our analysis abstracts away from the likely heterogeneous relationship between 
macroeconomic indicators and litigation rates in different industries, technologies, geographic 
regions, and party types (e.g., public vs. private company, large vs. small companies, 
practicing vs. nonpracticing entities). Because patents often play very differing roles from 
industry to-industry, our aggregate data might obscure more nuanced and richer accounts. For 
example, the increased volume of suits filed by nonpracticing entities (NPEs) may make the 
recent effects of rising TED spreads and real interest rates even more pronounced, leading to 
larger coefficients for these variables than reported here when controlling for entity type. 
Last, because we use counts, we do not measure the effects of the macroeconomy on 
the intensity of litigation, such as the amount spent on attorneys, experts, discovery, and the 
like, or on the outcomes of litigation, such as damages awards and settlement amounts. As we 
mentioned earlier, one survey found that general counsels planned on spending about 7.5 
percent less on litigation during the most recent downturn. One would expect, then, that 
litigation intensity would have decreased, but exactly when and in what manner remains a 
future research topic. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Practicing attorneys dispute whether economic downturns increase or decrease patent 
litigation rates. One camp—relying on data from all but the most recent recession—argues 
that downturns increase litigation because the rate of return from patent litigation rises relative 
to the sale of products and services. In other words, during downturns, litigation substitutes 
for traditional sales. Another camp, emphasizing the decline of patent litigation in the most 
recent recession, contends that capital constraints tend to reduce overall litigation rates during 
downturns.  
 In the first study of its kind, we resolve this debate. For patent litigation in the 1970s 
and 1980s, neither theory appears able to explain overall trends. However, both theories 
appear capable of explaining recent trends relative to the particular macroeconomic conditions 
of a downturn. The substitution theory is supported by a rise in overall patent litigation 
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concomitant with declines in GDP and investment. In contrast, the capital constraint theory is 
bolstered by the declines in patent litigation rates associated with increases in macroeconomic 
financial risk as measured by the TED spread and in T-bill and real interest rates. Our study 
indicates that in recent times overall patent litigation rates rise or fall depending on the nature 
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APPENDIX A: ONE-QUARTER LAG SPECIFICATION 
 
Table A reproduces the VARs in Table 2 with one-quarter lag instead of seven-quarter lags.  
Standard optimal lag tests supported the choice of either one or seven lags for these main 
specifications. 
 
Table A: Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, 1-Quarter Lag Main Specifications 
   
1971-2009 
 









S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Patent litigation 
diff, 





















































0.05  -0.05   0.06 
Real interest 








-0.027 **  
 
0.01 
R and D 
diff, 













In force Patents 
diff, 

























0.02  0.00   0.02 
NASDAQ 
diff, 













TED spread diff 1 
         













    
82 
   




    
-25.7 
   




    
-23.1 
   
 -25.2    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  156 quarters from 1971 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
DO DOWNTURNS DAMPEN PATENT LITIGATION? 
Marco, Miller & Sichelman 34     08/20/2015 
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE TIME PERIODS 
 
Table B-1 reports the results of the main specification in Table 2 but with shorter alternative 
time periods.  Because there are fewer quarters in these periods, the number of optimal lags is 
four instead of seven.  To compare the results in Table B-1 to the time periods in Table 2, 
Table B-2 reports the results of the main specification with the same time periods as in Table 
2 but with four-quarter lags.  Four is not the optimal number of lags for the main specification 
time periods in Table 2.  Thus, the results in Table B-2 are less reliable than those in Table 2. 
 






































































































































































































































TED spread diff 1 
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55 
   AIC 
  
-17.5 
    
-21.1 
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-13.7 
   NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  Stata “small” option used to increase standard errors 
(“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Table B-1 (continued): Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, Alternative Time Periods 
  
  
 1994-2007  1997-2009 
Variable 
 
Lag  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.   S.E. 
Patent diff, 1  -0.75 ***  0.16  -0.98 ***  0.12 
litigation log 2  -0.41 **  0.19  -0.40 ***  0.13 
  
3  -0.14   0.18  0.05   0.15 
  
4  -0.27   0.16  0.06   0.11 
Investment diff, 1  -0.82   0.80  -2.27    ***  0.57 
 
log 2  0.06   0.71  -3.02 ***  0.57 
  
3  0.80   0.72  -1.46    **  0.51 
  
4  0.32   0.67  -0.33   0.40 
Consumption diff, 1  -2.55   3.65  -0.49   1.90 
 
log 2  -1.99   5.02  9.91 **  3.40 
  
3  4.57   3.14  14.63 ***  2.49 
  
4  -3.90   3.84  9.35 ***  2.59 
Real diff 1  -0.15 ***  0.05  -0.02   0.03 
interest rate 
 
2  0.06   0.05  -0.00   0.03 
  
3  0.01   0.05  0.13 ***  0.03 
  
4  -0.03   0.03  -0.01   0.01 
R and D diff, 1  -0.39   1.00  -3.98 ***  0.97 
 
log 2  -1.76 *  0.95  -3.14 ***  0.56 
  
3  2.16 **  0.96  -0.95   0.72 
   4  -1.33   1.13  -1.12   0.80 
Inflation 
  
 -0.12 *  0.06  -0.09    **  0.04 
   
 0.19 **  0.09  0.02   0.06 
   
 -0.00   0.08  0.17 ***  0.05 
   
 -0.06   0.07  -0.14    ***  0.04 
NASDAQ diff, 1  0.14   0.13  0.23 **  0.10 
 
log 2  0.43 ***  0.12  0.39 ***  0.07 
  
3  -0.23   0.16  -0.17 *  0.09 
  
4  0.11   0.15  -0.31 ***  0.10 
TED spread diff 1  -0.02   0.05  0.04 *  0.02 
  
2  0.04   0.06  0.11 ***  0.03 
  
3  0.04   0.06  0.13 ***  0.03 
  
4  -0.00   0.05  0.06 **  0.03 
constant 
  
 0.05   0.09  -0.09 **  0.03 
Observations 
  
 51     47    
AIC 
  
 -23.8     -22.9    
BIC 
  
 -13.8     -12.5    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  Stata “small” option used to increase standard errors 
(“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.11  -0.73 ***  0.11 






0.15  -0.58 ***  0.13 
  














0.11  -0.21 **  0.10 






0.52  -0.08   0.64 
 
















0.54  1.20 *  0.68 






0.48  -0.74 
 
 0.60 






1.58  1.59   2.13 
 














1.85  3.76   2.82 






1.74  -5.01 *  2.87 
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0.05  -0.07 
 
 0.06 

























0.01  -0.00   0.03 






0.01  -0.01 
 
 0.02 






0.95  -1.51 *  0.76 
 
















0.89  0.85 
 
 0.79 






0.74  -0.42 
 
 0.88 






3.45  -2.12 
 
 2.41 

































































0.03  -0.05   0.05 






0.12  -0.08   0.11 
 






















0.12  0.22 **  0.11 
TED spread diff 1 
         
 -0.07 **  0.03 
  
2 






























    
79 
   




    
-26.4 
   




    
-16.4 
   
 -16.8    
 
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values. Stata “small” option used to increase standard errors 
(“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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APPENDIX C: IMPACT OF CONTROLLING FOR NUMBER OF PATENT GRANTS 
 
Table C reproduces the main specification VAR in Table 2 for the later subperiod (1986-2009) 
using the number of in-force patents and alternatively the number of patent grants as an 
independent variable. 
 
Table C: Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, Alternative Specification Using Number 
of Patent Grants Instead of Number of In-Force Patents 
  
   
1986-2009 







  Coef. 
 
S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 




0.13  -0.82 ***  0.13 


































0.13  -0.03   0.12 


































0.77  -1.63 **  0.71 




0.89  0.31   0.88 


































3.31  1.32   2.81 




3.27  -4.17   3.02 


































0.08  -0.02   0.08 




0.07  0.21 ***  0.07 



































0.05  0.11 **  0.04 




0.03  -0.01   0.02 




1.04  -2.14 **  0.92 
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0.94  -0.36   0.95 
In force diff, 1 1.39 
 
2.22      



































2.13      
Patent grants diff, 1 
     
 0.01   0.08 
 
log 2 
     
 0.14   0.09 
  
3 
     
 0.31 ***  0.10 
  
4 
     
 0.19 *  0.10 
  
5 
     
 0.13   0.10 
  
6 
     




     












































0.08  -0.23 ***  0.07 








































0.16  -0.12   0.15 








































0.04  0.12 ***  0.04 
constant 
   
0.24 *** 
 
0.08  0.17 **  0.07 
Observations 
   
88 
   
 88    
AIC 
   
-34.2 
   
 -28.8    
BIC 
   
-14.2 
   
 -8.8    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  96 quarters from 1986 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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APPENDIX D: ALTERNATIVE MAIN SPECIFICATION FOR 1986-2009 WITHOUT TED SPREAD 
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In Force diff, 1  -0.86  
 
2.22  































































































































   
88 
   
 
AIC 
   
-30.8 
   
 
BIC 
   
-14.6 
   
 
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  96 quarters from 1986 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX E: GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Each cell in Table E reports a Wald test that the coefficients on the lags of the independent 
variables on the left column are zero in the equation for patent litigation.  Thus, for the entire 
time period 1971-2009, p = 0.01 for consumption means that the coefficients on the lags of 
consumption are not jointly zero in the equation for patent litigation, indicating that the 
evidence favors the alternative that consumption causes patent litigation.  Note that TED 
spread is only available from to 1986-2009. 
 
Table E: Granger Causality Test Results for VAR Regressions in Table 2 
Reject the null that below 
does not cause patent 
litigation 1971-2009 1971-1991 1986-2009 
Investment 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Consumption 0.01 0.00 0.26 
Unemployment 0.87 0.00 0.00 
Real interest rate 0.14 0.00 0.03 
R and D 0.37 0.00 0.07 
In force patents 0.12 0.00 0.22 
Inflation 0.03 0.00 0.04 
NASDAQ 0.70 0.00 0.04 
TED   0.02 
NOTE: All variables used in underlying VAR are quarterly values.  156 quarters from 1971 through 
2009.  Stata “small” option used in underlying VAR to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account 
for number of observations.  p-values for F-statistics for joint Wald tests on lags reported. 
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APPENDIX F: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS WITH FEWER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Table F.1: Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, 1986-2009 
   
1: Table 2 minus NASD 
 









S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.11  -0.92 ***  0.11 






0.13  -0.84 ***  0.12 
  






0.13  -0.67 ***  0.12 
  






0.14  -0.66 ***  0.13 
  






0.14  -0.51 ***  0.13 
  














0.09  -0.09   0.09 






0.61  -0.63   0.47 
 






























0.64  -0.85   0.54 
  






0.65  -2.40 ***  0.57 






0.66  0.21   0.59 






2.11      
 






































2.82      






2.88      






0.07  -0.24 ***  0.06 
  






































0.08  -0.01   0.07 






0.07  0.26 ***  0.06 























0.04  0.01   0.03 
  






















0.04  0.02   0.04 






0.03  0.01   0.02 






0.79  -1.33 *  0.72 
 






















0.78  0.80   0.74 
  














0.80  -0.39   0.70 






0.76  0.71   0.66 
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In Force diff, 1 -1.88 
  
2.15 
     
     
Patents log 2 2.97 
  
2.66 
     





     





     
     
  
5 -4.56 * 
 
2.33 
     
     
  
6 6.43 ** 
 
2.31 
     
     
  
7 -4.41 ** 
 
2.09 
     

































0.08  -0.10 *  0.06 
  














0.07  -0.00   0.06 
  
 






0.07  -0.07   0.06 






0.04  -0.09 ***  0.03 
  














0.05  -0.03   0.04 
  






















0.04  0.05   0.04 
  



















    
88 
   




    
-20.1 
   




    
-7.3 
   
 -1.1    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values. 96 quarters from 1986 through 2009. Stata “small” option 
used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Table F.2: Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, 1971-1991 
   
1: Table 2 minus NASD 
 









S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.12  -1.06 ***  0.11 






0.16  -0.97 ***  0.15 
  






0.18  -0.93 ***  0.17 
  






0.18  -0.86 ***  0.16 
  






0.20  -0.88 ***  0.18 
  






0.20  -0.78 ***  0.16 
  






0.14  -0.41 ***  0.12 






0.54  0.22   0.54 
 






0.55  0.22   0.54 
  






















0.66  -0.26   0.45 
  






0.64  -1.06 **  0.48 






0.48  0.98 **  0.47 






1.47      
 






1.57      
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1.67      
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2.20      














0.06  0.05   0.06 
  






0.06  0.16 **  0.06 
  






















0.06  -0.03   0.06 






0.05  0.02   0.05 















































0.01  -0.04 **  0.02 






0.01  -0.02   0.02 






1.15  3.07 ***  1.11 
 






















0.94  -0.65   0.98 
  






1.02  -1.34   1.09 
  






1.02  -2.61 **  1.01 






0.81  -1.58 *  0.86 
In force diff, 1 -7.82 
  
4.96 
     
     
patents log 2 -2.50 
  
4.63 
     





     
     
  
4 -11.29 ** 
 
4.65 
     





     





     





     









0.03  0.00   0.03 
  






0.04  0.02   0.04 
  














0.04  0.01   0.04 
  




































    
76 
   




    
-16.8 
   




    
-6.0 
   
 -0.8    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  84 quarters from 1971 through 1991.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX G: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS WITH GDP INSTEAD OF CONSUMPTION AND 
INVESTMENT 
 
Table G reports results for the Table 2 main specifications, but where real consumption and 
real investment have been replaced with real GDP. 
 
Table G: Vector Autoregression of Patent Litigation, Alternative Specification with GDP 
   
1971-2009 
 









S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.09  -0.85 ***  0.11 






0.14  -0.76 ***  0.13 
  






0.15  -0.71 ***  0.13 
  






0.15  -0.58 ***  0.14 
  


























0.09  -0.02 
 
 0.12 






0.99  1.65   1.96 
 
































1.41  -5.64 **  2.28 
  






1.27  -8.26 ***  2.42 






1.23  0.46 
 
 2.59 


















































0.04  0.07 
 
 0.07 






0.03  0.23 ***  0.07 






0.01  -0.05   0.03 
rate 
 
























0.01  -0.07 *  0.04 
  














0.01  0.05   0.05 






0.01  0.01 
 
 0.03 






1.02  -2.46 ***  0.83 
 






































0.72  1.21 
 
 0.93 






0.73  0.80 
 
 0.91 






3.16  1.11 
 
 2.22 






















3.78  3.15   2.39 
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3.54  -3.49   2.61 
  
























































0.03  -0.06   0.07 
  



























0.02  -0.05   0.06 






0.08  -0.02   0.10 
 






0.08  0.09   0.11 
  








































0.10  -0.03 
 
 0.13 
TED spread diff 1 
         
 -0.07 *  0.04 
  
2 
























         
 0.10 **  0.05 
  
7 
















    
76 
   




    
-25.6 
   




    
-11.6 
   
 -9.1    
 
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  156 quarters from 1971 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX H: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION USING FOUR-QUARTER TRAILING AVERAGES 
 
Table H reproduces the main specifications in Table 2, but with that value of every 
independent variable recalculated as four-quarter trailing averages. 
 














S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 






0.11  -0.95 ***  0.13 






0.20  -0.89 ***  0.17 
  






0.29  -0.72 ***  0.20 
  






0.36  -0.14   0.22 
  






0.32  -0.01   0.22 
  






0.21  -0.05   0.17 
  






0.12  -0.12   0.12 






1.90  2.62   3.09 
 














1.93  0.34   4.66 
  






1.83  2.10   3.53 
  














1.90  -10.12 ***  3.35 






1.61  3.28   2.52 






6.71  11.81   13.58 
 






























7.63  8.19   19.06 
  






5.57  -9.70   23.26 






4.83  27.10 *  15.38 














































0.29  0.42   0.44 






0.19  0.15   0.33 































0.05  -0.16   0.27 
  














0.06  -0.16   0.21 






0.07  0.18   0.11 






6.18  -7.23   5.32 
 






























4.12  5.92   6.23 
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4.35  -2.00   4.49 






4.52  -7.12   6.13 






12.4  0.63   10.39 






















23.6  -1.84   12.89 
  






17.2  -16.66   12.28 
  






21.2  44.92 ***  13.30 
  
 







































0.22  -0.25   0.52 
  























0.11  0.32   0.27 






0.54  -0.32   0.46 
 






















0.54  1.03 *  0.55 
  






0.66  -0.43   0.69 
  






0.76  0.20   0.71 
  






0.61  0.31   0.58 
TED spread diff 1 
         
 -0.12   0.18 
  
2 
         
 0.03   0.16 
  
3 
         
 0.28   0.19 
  
4 
         
 0.25   0.16 
  
5 
         
 0.07   0.18 
  
6 
         
 -0.15   0.13 
  
7 
         













    
76 
   




    
-61.5 
   




    
-43.8 
   
 -41.7    
NOTE: All variables are quarterly values.  156 quarters from 1971 through 2009.  Stata “small” 
option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to account for number of observations. 
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APPENDIX I: EFFECTS OF SHOCKS ON PATENT LITIGATION 
 
Figures I-1 through I-9 report orthogonalized impulse response functions generated from the 
VAR regressions in Table 2. 
 








DO DOWNTURNS DAMPEN PATENT LITIGATION? 
Marco, Miller & Sichelman 50     08/20/2015 
(c) 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the log of real investment in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the 
percent change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
in gray. 
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NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the log of real consumption in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures 
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(c) 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to unemployment in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the percent 
change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals in gray. 
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NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the real interest rate in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the 
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(c) 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the log of real R&D in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the 
percent change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
in gray. 
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NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the log of total in force patents in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis 
measures the percent change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals in gray. 
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(c) 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to inflation in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the percent change 
in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals in gray. 
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NOTE: Solid lines represent the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the log of NASDAQ in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the 
percent change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
in gray. 
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Figure I-9: Effect of TED spread shock on patent litigation for Table 2 VAR, 1986-2009 
 
NOTE: Solid line represents the impulse response of patent litigation in a given quarter (horizontal axis) 
to a one standard deviation shock to the TED spread in Quarter 0.  Vertical axis measures the percent 
change in litigation in a quarter given that impulse.  Ninety-Five percent confidence intervals in gray. 
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APPENDIX J: FOURTEEN-PERIOD BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
Table J includes the results of bivariate VAR regressions of patent litigation on one of the 
independent variables analyzed and listed in the table.  Each data point in these regressions is 
the value of the variable over one of 14 alternative periods of economic expansion or 
contraction that occurred from 1970-2009.  The seven contractionary periods are: (1) 1970Q1-
1970Q4; (2) 1973Q4-1975Q1; (3) 1980Q1-1980Q3; (4) 1981Q3-1982Q4; (5) 1990Q3-
1991Q1; (6) 2001Q1-2001Q4; and (7) 2007Q4-2009Q2. 
 
Because LIBOR was only available after 1986, we constructed an alternative measure of 
financial risk that we term “TED Prime”—the difference between the U.S. prime rate and the 
3-month T-bill rate, rather than the LIBOR and the 3-month T-bill rate as in the standard TED 
spread.  Because fewer data points are available, the optimal number of lags for the bivariate 
VAR with TED is one.  Three lags are optimal for all other variables, including TED Prime. 
 
Table J: Bivariate VAR of Patent Litigation Over 14 Macroeconomic Periods 
Variable   Lag Coef.   S.E. 








  3 -2.86 ***   0.45 








3 -1.36 * 
 
0.77 








  3 -2.88 ***   0.45 




2 -0.13 *** 
 
0.04 
    3 0.00 
 
  0.06 



















    3 -0.00 
  
0.03 




log 2 2.56 *** 
 
0.56 
    3 1.71 ***   0.65 
In force diff, 1 -2.05 *** 
 
0.77 











log 2 0.23 
  
0.68 












    3 0.06 
  
0.08 
NASDAQ diff, 1 0.05 
  
0.28 
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log 2 -0.02 
  
0.23 
    3 0.03 
  
0.22 
TED prime diff 1 0.04   0.04 
  2 -0.12 ***  0.04 
    3 0.02    0.06 
TED diff 1 -0.27 **   0.14 
NOTE: All variables equal to their values over one of 14 economic expansions or contractions 
during the years 1970-2009. Stata “small” option used to increase standard errors (“S.E.”) to 
account for number of observations.  Constants for each bivariate VAR omitted. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
